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Abstract: The IEEE Std 802.15.6 is an international standard for wireless body area networks1
(WBANs). It contains many aspects of communications, and also provides security services since2
some communications in WBANs can carry sensitive information. In this standard, the password3
authenticated association is a protocol for two participants to identify each other and establish a4
new master key based on a pre-shared short password. However, recent researches show that this5
protocol is vulnerable to several attacks. In this paper, we propose an improved protocol which can6
resist all of these attacks. Moreover, the improved protocol alleviates computational burden on one7
side of the two participants, the node, which is usually less powerful compared with the other side,8
the hub.9
Keywords: body area networks; password authenticated association; security; key establishment;10
IEEE 802.15.611
0. Introduction12
A wireless body area network (WBAN) is a wireless network of wearable computing devices13
including implanted devices embedded inside the body or attached on the skin, and accompanied14
devices which humans can carry by hand, in clothes pockets or in bags[1–4]. WBANs applications[5,6]15
are growing and becoming more indispensable in people’s life due to the increasing accessability of16
network service and computing devices. Despite the great progress in networking and computing17
technology, security is one significant factor that influences users’ choice of WBANs applications18
since such applications involve a lot of personal information and therefore are vulnerable to security19
issues.20
IEEE Std 802.15.6[7] is an international standard for wireless communication between nodes and21
hubs in WBANs. It provides strong security for communications which carry sensitive information.22
In the security services of this standard, security association procedure activates a pre-shared or23
generates a new shared master key (MK) between a node and a hub. Several security association24
protocols suitable for a variety of use cases are provided in this standard. Among these protocols,25
password authenticated association[8,9] is a protocol for a node and a hub to generate a new shared26
MK from a pre-shared secret, i.e. the password. However, recent researches show that this protocol is27
vulnerable to several attacks, such as man-in-the-middle and impersonation attacks illustrated in [10],28
and the off-line dictionary attack and being lack of forward secrecy which are discussed in [11,12]. To29
eliminate these attacks, [10] also proposes a modified version to this protocol.30
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In this paper, an improved password authenticated association protocol is proposed. In the rest31
of this paper, we denote this protocol by the improved protocol, protocol in [10] by the modified protocol32
and protocol in the IEEE 802.15.6 standard by the standard protocol. Compared with the modified33
protocol and the standard protocol, the improved protocol eliminates all the above attacks on one34
hand. Moreover, it alleviates computational burden on the node. Since the node usually has limited35
computational power compared with the hub, the improved protocol is meaningful in practise.36
The rest parts of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 contains preliminaries and symbols37
that are useful in this paper. In Section 2, we reviews the standard protocol and available attacks38
in literatures. In Section 3, the improved protocol is proposed and its security and performance are39
analyzed in Section 4 and 5 respectively. Section 6 shows a use case of this improved protocol. Related40
works are provided in Section 7. At last, Section 8 concludes this paper.41
1. Preliminaries and Symbols42
1.1. Elliptic Curve Public Key Cryptography43
Elliptic Curve.44
The IEEE 802.15.6 password authenticated association protocol is based on the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange[13] employing the elliptic curve public key cryptography (ECC). An elliptic curve E
can be characterized by the following equation[14,15]:
y2 ≡ x3 + ax + b mod p
with a, b ∈ GF(p), 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 (1)
where (x, y) is a point on the curve; a and b are coefficients; p is an odd prime; and GF(p) is a45
prime finite field. For the choices of a suitable elliptic curve, the IEEE Std 802.15.6 suggests to use46
Curve p-256 in FIPS Pub 186-3. Values of a, b, p, the base point G = (Gx, Gy) and the order r of G are47
given in the standard.48
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman.49
Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) is an anonymous key agreement protocol that allows two
parties, each having an elliptic curve public-private key pair, to establish a shared secret over an
insecure channel [16]. Suppose SKA and SKB are private keys of two communicating parties A and B
respectively. SKA and SKB are random integers from the set {1, ..., r− 1}. The corresponding public
keys PKA and PKB are computed as follows
PKA = SKA × G, PKB = SKB × G (2)
where × denotes scalar multiplication of G by an integer. In the ECDH protocol, A and B exchange50
their public keys and compute (xk, yk) = SKA × PKB and (xk, yk) = SKB × PKA respectively. The51
shares key is xk, i.e. the X coordinate of the point.52
1.2. Password Authenticated Key Exchange53
The password authenticated association protocol in IEEE 802.15.6 standard is a variation of54
password authenticated key exchange (PAKE)[17]. A PAKE protocol uses a pre-shared password for55
an authenticated key establishment. The password is usually short and easy for human to remember,56
and is not stored directly in the memory of physical devices for security purpose, instead, it is input57
by the users at the beginning of each run of the PAKE protocol.58
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Table 1. Symbols and definations
Symbol Meaning
I identity of the initiator (i.e. the node)
R identity of the responder (i.e. the hub)
A identity of an adversary
PW the pre-shared password
K the temple Diffie-Hellman key used for computing CMAC
MK the master key to be generated
‖ concatenation of bit strings
SKI , PKI private and public keys of the initiator
SKR, PKR private and public keys of the responder
SKA, PKA private and public keys of the adversary
NI a nonce generated by the initiator
NR a nonce generated by the responder
NA a nonce generated by the adversary
Q(x) a function that maps a positive integer x to a point on the elliptic curve
G base point in the elliptic curve
× scalar multiplication
RMBn(x) the n rightmost bits of x
LMBn(x) the n leftmost bits of x
1.3. Symbols59
The association protocol is initiated by the node to generate a shared master key with the hub60
from a pre-shared password between them. We denote the node as the initiator and the hub as the61
responder. Some other symbols used in this paper are summarized in Table 1.62
2. IEEE 802.15.6 Password Authenticated Association Protocol63
We review the IEEE 802.15.6 password authenticated association protocol, i.e. the standard64
protocol, and discuss its vulnerabilities in this section.65
2.1. Description of The Standard Protocol66
Setup67
The initiator and the responder set up their private and public key as follows.68
1. Initiator chooses a random SKI and computes the public key PKI = SKI × G.69
2. Responder selects its private key SKR and computes PKR = SKR × G.70
Master Key Generation71
The initiator and the responder execute the following steps to generate a shared master key.72
1. The initiator computes a password-scrambled public key
PK′I = PKI −Q(PW) (3)
and sends it to the responder along with a nonce NI and the identities I and R:
M1 = {R, I, NI , PK′I}.
2. After receiving M1, the responder sends the identities, a nonce and its public key back to the
initiator:
M2 = {I, R, NR, PKR}
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3. The responder recovers PKI as follows
PKI = PK′I + Q(PW) (4)
The initiator and the responder compute the Diffie-Hellman key respectively through
K = SKI × PKR = SKR × PKI (5)
The responder computes a message authentication code
MAC3 = CMAC64(RMB128(K), I‖R‖NI‖NR) (6)
and then sends the initiator
M3 = {I, R, NR, PKR, MAC3}
4. The initiator verifies the received MAC3. If the verification succeeds, the initiator computes a
message authentication code
MAC4 = CMAC64(RMB128(K), R‖I‖NR‖NI) (7)
and sends the responder
M4 = {R, I, NI , PKI , MAC4}
5. The responder verifies MAC4. If the verification succeed, both parties compute and activate
their new master key as follows:
MK = CMAC128(LMB128(K), NI‖NR) (8)
2.2. Security Problems73
The standard protocol uses the password to hide the public key of the initiator through PK′I =74
PKI −Q(PW) in the first step, so that only the responder can recover PKI from PKI = PK′I + Q(PW).75
However, the protocol reveals PKI in M4 of step 4, which means an eavesdropper who intercepts M476
can acquire Q(PW). In this case, the password is no longer secret in following runs of the protocol.77
This is the reason for the vulnerabilities of the standard protocol. Security problems and attacks to78
this standard protocol in literatures are summarized as follows:79
• Impersonation attack. [10] illustrates an initiator impersonation attack and a responder80
impersonation attack to the standard protocol. At the end of these attacks, the attackers81
successfully establish a master key with one side of the communicating parties, while the other82
side thinks it has the shared master key with the true participant.83
• Man-in-the-middle attack. In [10] the authors show that an attacker breaks into the84
communication between the initiator and the responder and modifies the messages at his/her85
will. At last, the attacker shares two master keys with the initiator and the responder86
respectively, while the initiator and the responder think they have a shared master key. Figure87
1 is a time-sequence diagram that illustrates the procedure of man-in-the middle attack against88
the protocol.89
• Off-line dictionary attack. [11,12] show that a dictionary attacker who eavesdrops messages90
between the initiator and the responder in a protocol run can obtain PK′I and PKI and compute91
Q(PW) from Q(PW) = PKI − PK′I . Then Q(PW) can be used as a verifier and the attacker can92
try probable PWs from a dictionary of most probable passwords and check them using Q(PW)93
• Lack of forward secrecy. The author in [11,12] illustrates that if SKI has been compromised by an94
attacker, the attacker can acquire the Diffie-Hellman key K through computing K = SKI × PKR95
and MK from MK = CMAC128(LMB128(K), NI‖NR) since PKR, NI and NR are sent in clear.96
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Figure 1. The sequence diagram of man-in-the-middle attack.
2.3. The Modified Protocol97
The authors in [10] propose a modified protocol to the standard protocol. Specifically, the98
modified protocol is similar with the standard one except that it does not sent PKI in clear in M4.99
This modification solves most security problems as we mentioned in Section 2.2, but it still fails to100
provide forward secrecy. We will compare security and performance of the two protocols with those101
of our new proposed protocol later in this paper.102
3. The Improved Protocol103
The improved protocol assumes that PK and SK can be reused in each round of protocol. This104
assumption is reasonable since in the improved protocol the temporary Diffie-Hellman key K is105
derived from two random values chosen by the initiator and the responder respectively, rather than106
the public and private keys of them. The improved protocol is described in detail as follows.107
1. The initiator chooses a random value RI and computes
UI = RI + SKI (9)
and
PK′I = PKI −Q(PW). (10)
Then the initiator sends message M1 to the responder.
M1 = {I, R, UI , PK′I , NI}
2. The responder chooses a random value RR and computes
UR = RR + SKR (11)
Version November 11, 2016 submitted to Symmetry 6 of 14
and
TR = UR × G. (12)
Then the responder sends message M2 to the initiator
M2 = {R, I, TR, PKR, NR}.
3. The responder recovers PKI as follows
PKI = PK′I + Q(PW). (13)
The initiator computes the Diffie-Hellman key through
K = (TR − PKR)× RI = G× RR × RI . (14)
The responder computes K as follows
K = (UI × G− PKI)× RR = G× RR × RI (15)
With the K the responder computes a message authentication code
MAC3 = CMAC64(RMB128(K), I‖R‖NI‖NR) (16)
and then sends the initiator
M3 = {I, R, NR, PKR, MAC3}
4. The initiator verifies the received MAC3. If the verification succeeds, the initiator computes a
message authentication code
MAC4 = CMAC64(RMB128(K), R‖I‖NR‖NI) (17)
and sends the responder
M4 = {R, I, NI , MAC4}
5. The responder verifies MAC4. If the verification succeeds, both parties compute and activate
their new master key as follows:
MK = CMAC128(LMB128(K), NI‖NR) (18)
4. Security Analysis108
In Section 2.2 we listed all the attacks to the standard protocol, and in this section, we will prove109
the security of the improved protocol under all of these attack.110
4.1. Impersonation Attack.111
Proposition 1. Suppose the initiator and the responder have shared a password PW secretly, an112
attacker is not able to impersonate the initiator to establish the master key MK with the responder.113
Proof. Assume AI is an attacker who attempts to impersonate the initiator and establish MK with114
the responder. AI attacks the protocol as follows:115
1. AI initializes the protocol with the responder by sending the first message MA1 as follows:
MA1 = {I, R, UA, PK′I , NA}.
where UA = RA + SKA and RA and NA are random values generated by AI .116
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2. After receiving MA1, the responder chooses a random value RR and computes UR = RR + SKR
and TR = UR × G. Then the responder replies AI with M2:
M2 = {R, I, TR, PKR, NR}.
3. The responder recovers PKI and computes K = (UA × G − PKI) × RR. Then the responder
computes MAC3 = CMAC64(RMB128(K), I‖R‖NA‖NR) and sends the following message M3
to AI :
M3 = {I, R, NR, PKR, MAC3}.
4. At this step, AI needs to send the responder with MACA4 which should be equivalent with117
CMAC64(RMB128(K), R‖I‖NR‖NA) so that it can pass the verification at the beginning of the118
next step.119
In step 4, in order to compute a valid MACA4, AI has to calculate K equals to K = (UA × G −120
PKI)× RR = (RA × G + PKA − PKI)× RR. However, without any of PKI and RR, AI has no choice121
but to guess such a MACA4. The probability of guessing a valid MACA4 is 1264 .122
Alternatively, in the first piece of message MA1 the adversary AI can send a UI intercepted in123
previous protocol runs instead of UA. In this case, K computed by the responder in step 3 equals to124
(UI × G− PKI)× RR, G× RI × RR and (TR − PKR)× RI . It is still infeasible for AI to compute the K125
since RR and RI are unknown to AI .126
From the above analysis, now we can draw the conclusion that the probability for AI successfully127
impersonating the initiator and establishing a master key with the responder is 1264 , which is a minor128
value in a life circle of a normal node in WBANs applications.129
Proposition 2. Suppose the initiator and the responder have shared a password PW secretly, an130
attacker is not able to impersonate the responder to establish the master key MK with the initiator.131
Proof. Assume AR is an attacker who intends to impersonate the responder and establish MK with132
the initiator. AR attacks the protocol as follows:133
1. The initiator sends AR with M1 which is the same with the step 1 in the improved protocol:
M1 = {I, R, UI , PK′I , NI}.
2. After receiving M1, AR replies the initiator with MA2:
MA2 = {R, I, TA, PKA, NA}
with TA = UA × G and UA = RA + SKA where SKA is the private key of AR and RA and NA134
are random values generated by AR.135
3. At this step, AR needs to send the initiator with MACA3 involved in MA3 so that it can pass the136
verification at the beginning of the next step.137
The MACA3 is checked to be valid only if it equals to CMAC64(RMB128(K), I‖R‖NI‖NA). In order138
generate a valid MACA3, AR can compute the CMAC output by inputting K, I, R, NI , NA or guess the139
64-bit result. To compute the CMAC output, AR has to calculate K that equals the K calculated by the140
initiator through K = (TA − PKA)× RI = G × RA × RI . However, since RI is unknown to AR, it is141
infeasible for AR to acquire a valid K. Therefore, the adversary can only guess a valid MACA3 with a142
successful probability at 1264 , otherwise, the protocol will stop at the beginning of step 4 and the attack143
will fail.144
145
From Proposition 1 and 2 we can see impersonation attacks fail no matter the attacker146
impersonate the initiator or the responder.147
Version November 11, 2016 submitted to Symmetry 8 of 14
4.2. Man-in-the-middle Attack148
Proposition 3. Suppose the initiator and the responder have successfully shared a password PW, a149
man-in-the-middle attacker is not able to complete the improved protocol between the initiator and150
the responder without being detected.151
Proof. Suppose A is a man-in-the-middle attacker between the initiator and the responder. A152
participants the improve protocol as follows:153
1. The initiator sends A with M1 which is the same with M1 in the improved protocol:
M1 = {I, R, UI , PK′I , NI}.
1A. A replaces M1 with M1A and sends it to the responder:
MA1 = {I, R, UA, PK′I , NA}.
2. The responder replies A with M2 which is the same with M2 in the improved protocol:
M2 = {R, I, TR, PKR, NR}.
2A. A sends MA2 to the initiator:
MA2 = {R, I, TA, PKA, NA}
3. At this step, the Diffie-Hellman key KIA between A and the initiator and KRA between A and154
the responder are determined. Specifically, the initiator calculates KIA = (TA − PKA)× RI =155
G× RA × RI and the responder calculates KRA = (UA × G− PKI)× RR = (RA × G + PKA −156
PKI)× RR.157
The responder computes MAC3 = CMAC64(RMB128(KRA), I‖R‖NA‖NR) and sends A with
M3:
M3 = {I, R, NR, PKR, MAC3}
3A. A should send the initiator with
MA3 = {I, R, NA, PKA, MACA3}
where MACA3 = CMAC64(RMB128(KIA), I‖R‖NI‖NA)158
4. The initiator verifies MACA3.159
4A. A should send the responder with
MA4 = {R, I, NA, MACA4}
where MACA4 = CMAC64(RMB128(KRA), I‖R‖NA‖NR)160
5. The responder verifies MACA4161
Since A does not have any of RI , RR, PK′I , it is infeasible for A to compute KIA and KRA, and162
therefore A can not compute correct MACA3 in step 3A and MACA4 in step 4A. Without valid MACA3163
and MACA4, the initiator will stop the protocol at the beginning of step 4 and the responder will stop164
at the beginning of step 5, which means A fails to establish a MK either with the initiator or the165
responder.166
4.3. Off-line Dictionary Attack167
Proposition 4. Suppose the initiator and the responder have successfully shared a password PW,168
a passive eavesdropper who records the one or more sessions of the improved protocol cannot169
eliminate a significant number of possible passwords.170
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Proof. In the improved protocol, values that are sent in clear include I, R, UI , PK′I , NI , TR, PKR, NR,171
MAC3 and MAC4. In order to carry out an off-line dictionary attack, the adversary needs to acquire172
information that can help him to check possible passwords from a dictionary. Among all of these173
values sent in clear, PW has relationship only with PK′I through the equation PK′I = PKI − Q(PW).174
PKI is kept secretly in the protocol, and PKI = SKI ×G where SKI is a random integer. Therefore, PKI175
is a random value and is unknown to the adversary. The equation of PK′I = PKI − Q(PW) and the176
value of PK′I do not give more information of PW to the attacker. Based on these acquired knowledge,177
the attacker is unable to eliminate possible passwords.178
According to Proposition 4, an off-line dictionary attack to the improved protocol is infeasible.179
4.4. Forward Secrecy180
Proposition 5. Suppose the initiator and the responder have successfully shared a password PW,181
compromise of the long-term secret keys of a set of principals does not compromise the MKs182
established in previous runs of the improved protocol involving those principals.183
Proof. The principals of this protocols are the initiator and the responder, and the long-term secret184
keys of these principals are the private keys SKI and SKR, the password PW and the public key185
PKI that is masked during transmission. Assume the adversary A compromises these long-term186
secrets of the initiator and the responder, then (s)he has SKI , SKR, PW and PKI . In order to187
calculate a MK established in a previous run, A needs to compute MK from the formula MK =188
CMAC128(LMB128(K), NI‖NR) where K is a necessary input in that run. Note that A can not use these189
values to run the protocol with the principles, since in this case the MK is not belong to previous run,190
but is established in the current run. Therefore, A has to compute K through K = (TR − PKR)× RI ,191
K = (UI × G − PKI) × RR or K = G × RR × RI . All of the three formulas require at leat one192
of RI and RR. However, RI and RR are random values chosen by the initiator and the responder193
respectively in each run of the protocol, which means these values change in every protocol run and194
are kept unknown to A. Without any of RI and RR, A fails to compromise the MK, although (s)he195
compromises all the long-term secret keys and values.196
From Proposition 5 we can see the improved protocol provides forward secrecy.197
5. Performance198
In order to observe the performance of the improved protocol, we evaluate the computation199
and communication cost theoretically. In addition, we also test the performance through a set of200
experiments.201
5.1. Evaluation202
The overall burden of the protocol contains three parts: communication cost, computation cost203
on the node and computation cost on the hub. For the communication cost, we count the whole204
pieces of messages transmitted between the node and the hub within a run of the protocol. In order205
to evaluate the computation cost, we count the number of cryptographic algorithm CMAC and scalar206
multiplication of an element from the ecliptic curve by an integer, since other operations such as207
addition and subtraction require minor computation cost.208
Denote the cost of transmitting a piece of message by M, the cost of executing one CMAC209
algorithm by H, and the cost of executing the operation of scalar multiplication for one time by S ,210
we compare the evaluated cost of the improved protocol with the modified protocol and the standard211
protocol in Table 2.212
From Table 2 we can see that the improved protocol reduces computation cost on the node, while213
overall computation and communication cost does not increase. One time-consuming operation S is214
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improved protocol S + 2H 3S + 2H 4S + 4H 4M
modified protocol 2S + 2H 2S + 2H 4S + 4H 4M
standard protocol 2S + 2H 2S + 2H 4S + 4H 4M
Table 3. Details of the node (implemented on Arduino Uno)
Micro controller 16MHz, 8bit (ATmega328)
SRAM 2KB
EEPROM 1KB
Flash memory 32KB (bootloader 0.5K)
done by the hub on behalf of the node. Since the hub is more powerful compared with the node, the215
improved protocol is more affordable for WBANs applications.216
5.2. Experiments217
The improved protocol contains the algorithm of CMAC and ECC key-generation (generating a218
private key and using scalar multiplication to compute the public key). We test the runtime of these219
algorithms on the node through a set of experiments. In the experiments, we use Arduino Uno as the220
node, SHA-256 as the CMAC algorithms and the ATECC108A crypto chip from Atmel to execute the221
ECC key-generation. The elliptic curve is Curve p-256 in FIPS Pub 186-3. Description of the node is222
listed in Table 3 and the results are summarized in Table 4.223
From Table 4 we can see the runtime of executing these algorithms is affordable for the node,224
which means the improved protocol is suitable for WBANs applicaitons.225
6. Use Case226
As described before, our improved protocol reduced the computational burden on one side of227
communication. This is a significant strength for some applications in wireless sensor networks.228
Here we describe a smart lock system that uses our improved protocol to generate a master key. The229
specific system and the usage of the improved protocol is described as follows.230
Smart Lock System231
As is shown in Figure 2, the smart lock system is consist of a lock which is a physical host232
embedded with a computational device, and a phone which has installed a smart lock application.233
The aim of this system is using this phone application to securely lock or unlock the lock. Obviously,234
the computationally limited lock is the initiator and the relatively powerful phone is the responder.235
The smart lock system includes the following three phases, and our protocol is involved in the first236
phase.237
1. Master Key Generation. The lock and the phone secretly input the short password, and then238
execute our improved protocol. After this stage, a relatively long master key is shared by the239
lock and the phone.240
Table 4. Runtime of involved cryptographic algorithms on the node
Algorithm Length of keys (bits) Runtime (ms)
ECC key generation – 48
SHA-256 512 3
Version November 11, 2016 submitted to Symmetry 11 of 14
Figure 2. Smart lock system.
2. Session Key Generation. With the master key, the lock and the phone execute the session key241
generation protocol (such protocols are available in literatures) to generate their session key for242
this round of communication.243
3. Secure Communication. The newly generated session key is used for this round of244
communication between the phone and the lock. We describe the steps of as245
(1) The phone computes
MAC = HMAC(sessionkey, P‖L‖Request‖Counter)
and sends the request (LOCK/UNLOCK) with the MAC to the lock. Here P and L denote246
the identity of the phone and the lock, and Counter denotes the value of counter.247
(2) The lock verifies the MAC. If the verification succeeds, the lock executes the request to248
lock or unlock; else it does not execute the request or responds a failure message.249
Analysis250
The smart lock system is secure since the session key is kept secretly by the two participants.251
An adversary can not request the system to lock or unlock, because they can not compute the correct252
MAC without the session key. Therefore, the security of the session key is significant for the security253
of the whole system. Our improved protocol provides secure generation for the master key which in254
turn guarantees the security of the session key.255
Additionally, the device embedded in the lock is a less powerful device compared with a normal256
cell phone. Our password-based authenticated association protocol in the first phase reduces the257
computational cost of the lock, which makes the smart lock system more practicable.258
7. Related Works259
7.1. Comparison260
In Section 5.1 we compared the cost of the improved protocol with other related protocols in261
Table 2. The comparison in terms of security of these protocols is listed in Table 5, where
√
means262
being secure under the corresponding attacks or providing the corresponding security feature, while263
×means being insecure or not providing.264
7.2. Password-based Two-party Key Exchange265
Several password-based authenticated key exchange protocols have been proposed. In this266
subsection, we compare our improved protocol with three kinds of two-party key exchange protocols267
which are based on password.268
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Table 5. Comparison of security (“
√
” denotes the protocol resist the attack or possess the security
feature, and “×” denotes the the protocol does not resist the attack or does not possess the security
feature)









Encrypted Key Exchange Using Diffie-Hellman269
Diffie-Hellman-based Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocols transmit the public keys270
encrypted using the password. The original protocol is proposed by Bellovin and Merritt in [21].271
Variants and extensions of this protocol have been proposed. Such protocols are proved to be secure in272
random-oracle model, however, in practice attacks against these protocols exist since the two parties273
are not able to verify the integrity of the received messages. If an attacker maliciously modifies the274
message, the two participants will generate different keys while they are not aware.275
The IEEE std password authenticate association protocol and our improved protocol are276
developed from these kind of protocols. As in the IEEE std protocol and our improved protocol277
HMAC is used for verifying the integrity of messages transmitted between the two parties, the above278
attacks against the original Diffie-Hellman-based EKE protocols are eliminated.279
RSA-Based Protocols280
RSA-Based Protocols use the RSA algorithm as the basis of the password authentication key281
exchange scheme. In [22] MacKenzie proposed a variant of RSA based open key exchange protocol282
called SNAPI (Secure Network Authentication with Password Information). Verification for the283
integrity of transmitted messages is involved in this protocol. However, this protocol is not suitable284
for wireless sensor networks since sensors are usually not powerful enough to run the RSA algorithm.285
Protocols Using a Server Public Key286
Some password-based authenticated key exchange protocols use a server public key in addition287
to the pre-shared password. Such protocols include the GLNS compact protocol proposed by Gong288
et al. in [23], Gong’s Optimal GLNS nonce-based protocol in [24], Kwon-Song Protocol in [25] and289
Halevi-Krawczyk Protocol in [26]. However, all of the four protocols used public key encryption,290
which is too high in computational cost for sensor devices. Moreover, the former two protocols need291
the participation of a server.292
8. Conclusion293
In low-power, low-complexity wireless sensor network applications such as WBANs, the294
communications security requirements mainly include authentication between participants, as well295
as confidentiality and integrity of transmitted messages. Mechanisms that aim to satisfy these296
requirements usually need a secret key to be held by participants. Therefore, key establishment297
and management are significant for security service in communications networks. The password298
authenticated association protocol is a scheme for the participants to generate a master key from a299
pre-shared password.300
Considering the asymmetric power of the two participants in WBANs, we propose an improved301
password authenticated association protocol that reduces the computational cost on the less powerful302
participant of communication. The improved protocol can resist both impersonation attacks and303
man-in-the-middle attacks. A master key between the node and the hub will be established securely304
and efficiently through this protocol, and afterwards this is used for pairwise temporal key (PTK)305
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creation, and the PTK is the key used in encryption and decryption process to provide authentication,306
confidentiality and integrity for communication.307
The improved protocol requires one scalar multiplication and two HMAC computations on the308
nodes (i.e. the initiator). Since the computational costs of these algorithms are acceptable to devices309
with limited power in WBANs, the improved protocol is suitable for applications in WBANs.310
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